分包和不完全竞争性招标

分包和不完全竞争性招标(中文3800字,英文2500字)
文   摘
本文研究了成本契约的不完全性及其意义除在桥梁施工分包决定产业。建设合同是不完整的,因为在施工期间原始设计图和规格可能需要修改。根据交易成本理论-科斯(1937),威廉姆森(1985)|合同的修改会导致显著的谈判，暨南成本 。此外,理论预测这些成本如果分包商执行更大的工作。向前看的承包商预期这些成本并将他们投标。我创造了一个实证框架量化在成本上的影响都不整合,非综合交易并把它应用到32桥招惹加洲合同离开-品德的交通工具。合同中包含许多工作条款(如铸造混凝土,钻井、交通分拆涂料)。每个项目,承包商决定是否执行操作自己或租一分包商并提交一份报价。不同之间的工作在原合同项目数量,数量安装后——其实残缺的代表。在估计,我解释战略方面招标投标,并恢复成本结构,利用面板数据帐户分包商为拥的决定。平均来说,不完全性解释一小部分费用,2%,为综合交易和很大一部分,13%,非综合交易。研究结果提供定量的证据支持在-完整的承包和理论具有一定的实际得到评估采购工作.

外文原文：
Subcontracting and Competitive Bidding on Incomplete Procurement Contracts
This paper investigates the cost implications of contractual incompleteness and itse ect on subcontracting decisions in the bridge construction industry. Construction contracts are incomplete because the original blueprints and specications may require modications during construction. According to the transactions cost theory of the rm|Coase (1937), Williamson (1985)|such contract revisions can lead to signicant bargaining and renegotiation costs. Furthermore, theory predicts these costs are larger if a subcontractor performs the work. Forward looking contractors anticipate these costs and incorporate them in their bids. I develop an empirical framework to quantify the impact of incompleteness on cost for both integrated and non-integrated transactions and apply it to 32 bridge contracts procured by the California Depart-ment of Transportation. Contracts contain many work items (e.g. casting concrete,drilling, trac striping). For each item, contractors decide whether to perform work themselves or hire a subcontractor and submit a bid. The di erence between the work item quantity in the original contract and the quantity actually installed after revi-sions proxies for incompleteness. In estimation, I account for the strategic aspects of bidding to recover cost from bids and exploit the panel data structure to account for the endogeneity of subcontracting decisions. On average, incompleteness explains a small portion of cost, 2%, for integrated transactions and a large portion, 13%, for non-integrated transactions. The results provide quantitative evidence in support of in-complete contracting theories of the rm and have practical signicance for evaluating procurement practices.