政治关联对民营企业环保投资的影响研究(硕士)

政治关联对民营企业环保投资的影响研究(硕士)(论文100000字)
摘  要
改革开放近四十年来，中国经济发展取得了令世界瞩目的成绩。然而资源耗竭、环境污染与生态破坏已经成为严重制约我国经济可持续发展，危害人类健康生存的重大问题，如何有效保护自然资源与生态环境，是我国面临的最迫切问题之一，也是理论界与实务界共同关注的重要话题。企业作为社会经济活动中的重要主体，同时又是环境污染的主要制造者，在保持经济与环境协调发展的过程中具有举足轻重的作用，理应担负起环境保护与污染治理的主体责任。但是，由于环境资源的公共物品属性和环境污染的负外部性，加之环保投资具有资金占用量大、投资周期长、经济效益低等特点，多数企业没有主动进行环保投资和污染治理的意愿，因此，政府需要通过“有形之手”进行环境管制，以解决环境保护方面存在的市场失灵。企业是政府环境规制政策实施的重要对象，政府的环境保护措施通过企业这一中间载体进行传导，企业通过环保投资行为最终落实政策。政治关联是政府与企业关系的具体化，由于企业政治关联现象的广泛存在，政府与企业之间的环保投资行为决策机制和传导过程就成为一个值得深入探讨的问题。
目前，国内外对政治关联和企业环保投资的研究均涌现出了大量理论和实证研究成果，极大地丰富了这两个领域的研究内容和深度，但是将政治关联与企业环保投资行为结合起来进行研究的文献较少，并且现有的环保投资方面的研究主要侧重于以政府为主导的政府环保投资与行业环保投资方面，基于企业微观层面数据的相关实证研究较少。本文以微观民营企业为对象研究政治关联与环保投资行为之间的关联，具有重要的理论意义与实践意义：从理论角度看，本文基于微观层面的民营企业数据对企业环保投资与政治关联之间的关系进行研究，并考察在不同环境规制强度条件和差异化区域经济发展状况下政治关联对企业环保投资的影响，这将丰富完善政治关联影响企业环保投资的理论研究框架；从实践角度看，通过研究政治关联对民营企业环保投资行为的影响及作用机制，可以为民营企业与政府建立健康、良性的关系提供有益指导，也可以为政府制定与完善相应的环境法律法规与政策、有效发挥政府“有形之手”作用、正确引导企业进行环保投资提供重要参考。
本文运用环境经济学、政治经济学、会计学与财务学等多学科知识，以实证研究与规范研究相结合的方法，主要探讨了以下三个问题：一是政治关联对民营企业环保投资的影响及作用机制，重点分析政府环保补助在其中发挥的作用，并深入分析不同高管层级的政治关联与不同政府层级的政治关联对民营企业环保投资的影响；二是在不同环境规制强度下，政治关联如何影响民营企业环保投资。本文采用多种方法衡量地区环境规制强度，实证检验环境规制强度对民营企业环保投资的影响，并重点检验了环境规制对政治关联与民营企业环保投资关系的调节效应；三是在差异化区域经济发展水平条件下，政治关联与民营企业环保投资之间的关系，重点考察政治关联对民营企业环保投资规模影响的变动情况。
本文的主要研究结论是：
第一，我国企业环保投资呈增长趋势但规模总量相对较小。2008-2015年我国重污染行业上市公司的环保投资总额基本保持了增长态势，但规模总量相对较小。对民营企业来说，这种现象显得更为严峻。民营企业环保投资虽然在研究期内也保持了增长态势，但体量更加微小，而且民营企业的环保投资更多的是环保费用方面的表面性支出，涉及环保设备更新、技术升级方面的资本化环保支出规模更小。因此，民营企业在环保投资领域中的表现并不出色，在生态文明建设的大潮下还需要承担更多的环保责任。
第二，政治关联有助于民营企业增加环保投资。本文通过实证检验发现，具有政治关联的民营企业环保投资规模要比不具有政治关联的民营企业环保投资规模更高，即政治关联可以促进民营企业增加环保投资。从环保投资的资金来源看，具有政治关联的民营企业费用化的环保投资增加更为显著，资本化的环保投资增加相对较小。另外，具有中央政治关联的民营企业对中央政府的环保意图和决策领会更深，更倾向于执行国家的环保要求，承担更多的环保责任；而具有地方政治关联的民营企业有时候会与地方政府达成某种默契，迎合地方政府追求经济政绩的需要，从而削弱了环保投资力度。
第三，政治关联可以帮助民营企业获取更多的政府环保补助并进一步增加企业环保投资。与政府建立“关联”确实可以帮助民营企业获得更多的政府环保补助，尤其是董事长和CEO的政治关联发挥了主要作用。并且民营企业获得的政府环保补助更多地来源于地方政治关联，中央政治关联在整体上并没有带来民营企业政府环保补助的显著增加。
第四，地区环境规制对企业政治关联与环保投资之间的关系具有倒U型的调节效应。环境规制强度与民营企业环保投资规模正相关，环境规制约束越强，民营企业的环保投资规模越大。与此同时，地区环境规制强度会改变民营企业政治关联与其环保投资的原有线性关系。本文发现，存在一个环境规制强度的临界值使民营企业政治关联对其环保投资的影响呈倒U型分布。即当地区环境规制强度低于某个临界值时，随着环境规制强度的上升，民营企业政治关联有助于促进其环保投资规模的增加；当地区环境规制强度突破该临界值后，环境规制强度越高，民营企业的政治关联反而不利于企业环保投资规模的扩大。
第五，差异化的区域发展条件能够显著影响民营企业政治关联与其环保投资之间的关系。经济发展水平越高的地区企业环保投资也越多，经济发展水平较低的地区企业环保投资规模相对较低。并且本文实证研究发现在差异化的区域经济条件下，民营企业的政治关联对其环保投资的影响受到了显著的负向冲击。也就是说，在经济发展水平较高的地方，具有政治关联的民营企业可以显著而且幅度较大地增加环保投资，而在经济发展水平较低的地方，民营企业政治关联对环保投资规模的积极促进效应会出现比较明显的下滑，导致企业环保投资规模增加的幅度有限，在极端情况下，可能造成企业环保投资规模的萎缩。
本文的研究贡献主要体现在以下几个方面：
第一，本文丰富了企业环保投资影响因素及政治关联与经济后果的研究文献。一方面，本文从政治关联角度对企业环保投资影响因素的研究领域进行有益补充，另一方面也为检验政治关联对环境治理产生的影响做了积极的尝试，以更加全面地理解政治关联对企业经营决策的影响。
第二，本文探讨政治关联对民营企业环保投资的影响与作用机制时，将政府环保补助纳入研究框架，体现了研究链条的完整性。同时，本文将企业环保投资细分为资本化的环保投资与费用化的环保投资，以更好地理解民营企业在面对政府施加的环保压力时，将会如何应对。
第三，本文不仅关注“有无政治关联”问题，同时也关注“政治关联强弱”的问题，并且探讨了民营企业不同高管层级与不同政府层级的政治关联。本文从多个维度来刻画民营企业政治关联以及强度，进一步厘清了政治关联的边界。
第四，本文综合考虑了地区环境规制强度与地区经济发展压力对政治关联和民营企业环保投资关系的外部调节效应，从而为更好地发挥政府“有形的手”的作用提供直接的经验依据。

关键词：政治关联；民营企业；企业环保投资；政府环保补助；环境规制；区域经济发展

 
Abstract
China's economic development has made remarkable achievements in the world since the reform and opening up for about forty years. However, resource exhaustion, environmental pollution and ecological destruction have become major issues, which seriously restricted the sustainable development of China's economy and endanger the human health and survival. How to effectively protect natural resources and ecological environment is one of the most urgent problems faced by China, and is also an important topic of common concern between the theoretical and practical circles.
Enterprises as an important subject in social economic activities, are the main producers of environmental pollution at the same time. They play a decisive role in maintaining the coordinated development of economy and environment. And they should shoulder the main responsibility of environmental protection and pollution control. However, due to the public goods nature of the environmental resources, the negative externalities of environmental pollution, and the complex characteristics of environmental investment which combine the large amount of capital, long investment cycle and low economic benefit. Most enterprises is unwilling to actively carry out investment in environmental protection and pollution control. The government needs environmental control to solve the market failure in environmental protection. Enterprises are important targets for the implementation of government environmental regulation policies. The government's environmental protection measures are transmitted through of enterprises which act like the medium carrier, and enterprises finally implement policies through environmental investment behaviors. Because of the existence of corporate political connection, the decision-making mechanism and transmission process of environmental investment behavior between government and enterprises has become a problem which is worthy of exploring deeply.
At present, a lot of theoretical and empirical research results have emerged in the study of political connection and enterprise environmental investment at home and abroad, which greatly enrich the content and depth of research in these two fields. But there is less literature on the combination of political connection and enterprise environmental investment behavior. In addition, the existing research on environmental protection investment is mainly focused on environmental investment of government and enterprise which is led by government. There are few empirical researches on the micro level data of enterprises. In this paper, the relationship between political connection and environmental investment behavior is studied.
The significance of this paper is: First, from a theoretical perspective, this paper studies the relationship between corporate environmental investment and political connections based on the micro level data of private enterprises, which will enrich the academic literature in the field of corporate investment and expand the research perspective of environmental investment as well. This paper explores the impact of political connections on corporate environmental investment, and also examines the impact of political connections on corporate environmental investment under the condition of differentiated regional economic development and environmental regulation intensity. This will further enrich the theoretical framework of the influence of political connection on environmental investment in enterprises.
Second, from the practical point of view, it can provide useful guidance for enterprises to build healthy and benign relationship with the government by studying the influence and mechanism of political on connection corporate environmental investment behavior. It can also formulate and improve relevant environmental laws and regulations and policies for the government. That helps government to effectively play the role of "tangible hand", and provide an important reference for enterprises to guide their environmental investment.
Based on the multidisciplinary knowledge of environmental economics, political economics, accounting and finance, we combine the way of empirical research with normative research in this paper, and mainly discuss the following three questions:
First, we discuss the influence and mechanism of political connection on the corporate environmental protection investment. We selectively analyzing the function of the government's environmental protection subsidy in this part, and analysis the influence of political connection of different executive levels and different types on the enterprise's environmental investment in detail
Second, we discuss how the political relationship affects the enterprise's environmental investment under the intensity of different environmental regulations. The intensity of the regional environmental regulation is measured by the single index method, the alternative index method and the compound index method in this paper. We empirically testing the impact of environmental regulation intensity on environmental protection investment, and focus on the regulation effect of environmental regulation on the relationship between political connection and corporate environmental investment
Third, we explore the relationship between political connection and corporate environmental investment under the condition of differentiated regional economic development, focusing on the impact of political connections on the scale of corporate environmental investment.
The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:
First, the corporate environmental investment is growing, but the total amount is relatively small. From 2008 to 2015, the total amount of environmental protection investment of Listed Companies in heavy pollution industry has basically maintained the trend of growth, but the total amount of them is relatively small. This phenomenon is more severe for private enterprises. Although private enterprises' environmental investment has maintained a growth trend during the research period, their volume is even more small. Furthermore, more of their environmental investment is a superficial expense for environmental costs, and the amount of capital invested in environmental protection equipment updates and technology upgrades is smaller. Therefore, the performance of private enterprises in the field of environmental protection investment is not excellent. More environmental responsibility should be taken by private enterprises under the tide of ecological civilization construction.
Second, political connection will help enterprises to increase investment in environmental protection. Through empirical analysis, it is found that the scale of environmental protection investment of private enterprises with political connections is higher than that of private enterprises with no political connections. That means, political connections can promote private enterprises to increase environmental investment. From the perspective of the source of environmental protection investment, the cost of environmental protection investment increased significantly by private sector, and the increase of capitalized environmental investment is relatively small. Besides, private enterprises with central political connections are more aware of the central government's environmental intentions and decisions, and are more inclined to implement the national environmental protection requirements and assume more responsibility for environmental protection. In addition, private enterprises with local political connections sometimes have some tacit agreement with local governments, which caters to the needs of local governments in pursuit of economic performance and undermines investment in environmental protection.
Third, political connections can help private enterprises get more government environmental protection subsidies and further increase enterprise environmental investment. Political connections do help companies get more government subsidies, especially the political connections between the chairman and the CEO. The government's environmental subsidy from private enterprises is mainly from the local political connections. The central political connections do not bring a significant increase in the government's environmental subsidies.
Fourth, regional environmental regulation has an inverted U regulation effect on the relationship between enterprise political connection and environmental investment. The intensity of environmental regulation is positively related to the scale of environmental protection investment of private enterprises, the stronger the constraints of environmental regulation, the more environmental protection investment of private enterprises. At the same time, the intensity of regional environmental regulation will change the original linear relationship between the political connection of private enterprises and the investment of environmental protection. It is found in this paper that the existence of a critical value of the intensity of environmental regulation makes the impact of the political connection of private enterprises on its environmental investment in an inverted U type. That is to say, when the regional environmental regulation strength is lower than a critical value, with the increase in the intensity of environmental regulation, the political connection of private enterprises is helpful to promote the increase of investment in environmental protection; when the regional environmental regulation intensity above this critical value, the higher the strength of environmental regulation, the political connection of private enterprises but not conducive to the expansion of business the scale of investment in environmental protection.
Fifth, the difference of regional development conditions can significantly affect the relationship between the political connection of private enterprises and the investment in environmental protection. The higher the level of economic development, the more environmental investment in local enterprises, and the environmental investment scale of local enterprises is relatively low with low level of economic development. And the empirical research shows that the impact of private enterprises' political connections on their environmental investment has been significantly negatively impacted under the differentiated regional economic conditions. That means, the private enterprises with political connections can significantly and substantially increase the investment in environmental protection in places where the level of economic development is high. While the positive effect of the political connection of private enterprises on the scale of environmental protection investment will have a relatively obvious decline in the place where the economic development level is low. This will lead to the scale of enterprises' investment in environmental protection is limited. In extreme cases, the scale of environmental protection investment may be reduced.
The main contributions of this paper are reflected in the following aspects:
First, this paper enrich the research literature of enterprise environmental protection investment factors and economic consequences of the political connections. On the one hand, this paper makes a beneficial supplement to the research field of the influencing factors of enterprise environmental protection investment from the perspective of political connection, on the other hand, it also makes a positive attempt to test the influence of political connection on environmental governance, so as to understand the influence of political connection on enterprise management decision more comprehensively.
Second, this paper discusses the impact of political connections on private enterprises' environmental protection investment and the influencing mechanism. Also, this paper takes the government environmental protection subsidies into the research framework, reflecting the integrity of the research chain. At the same time, this paper divides the enterprise environmental protection investment into the capitalization of environmental protection investment and the expensed cost of environmental protection investment, in order to better understand the private enterprises’ decision in the face of environmental pressure from the government.
Third, this paper not only focuses on the issue of "whether there is political connection", but also pay attention to the issue of "how strong the political connection is", and discusses the political connection between different executive levels of private enterprises and different levels of government. This paper describes the political connection and strength of private enterprises from multiple dimensions, and further clarifies the boundary of political connection.
Fourth, this paper comprehensively considered the regional environmental regulation intensity and regional economic development pressure on the political connections and private enterprises environmental protection investment relationship of external regulation effect, so as to better play the role of the government's " tangible hands" to provide a direct empirical basis.

Key Words: Political Connection; Private Enterprise; Enterprise Environmental Protection; Government Subsidies for Environmental Protection; Environmental Regulation; Regional Economic Development

 
目  录
摘  要    1
Abstract    I
目  录    1
导  论    1
一、选题背景、研究目的与意义    1
（一）选题背景    1
（二）研究目的与意义    3
二、研究思路、内容与方法    4
（一）研究思路    4
（二）研究内容    6
（三）研究方法    6
三、核心概念界定    7
（一）政治关联    7
（二）企业环保投资    8
（三）民营企业    9
第一章  文献综述与理论基础    11
第一节  文献综述    11
一、政治关联研究    11
二、企业环保投资研究    16
三、政治关联对企业环保投资影响研究    19
四、文献评述    20
第二节  理论基础    21
一、资源基础理论    21
二、寻租理论    23
三、外部性理论    25
四、环境规制理论    28
第二章  制度背景与企业环保投资现状分析    31
第一节  民营企业政治关联的制度背景    31
一、中国制度背景下的民营企业政治关联    31
二、制度影响民营企业政治关联的一般途径    32
第二节  企业环保投资的制度背景    34
一、国内环境保护的制度背景    34
二、企业环保投资的制度动因    35
第三节  我国重污染行业企业环保投资现状    36
一、企业环保投资概况    37
二、企业环保投资的行业分布    39
三、企业环保投资的地区分布    40
第四节  本章小结    42
第三章  政治关联、政府环保补助与民营企业环保投资    43
第一节  理论分析与研究假设    43
一、政治关联与民营企业环保投资    43
二、政治关联与政府环保补助    45
三、政治关联、政府环保补助与民营企业环保投资    46
第二节  研究设计    46
一、样本选择    47
二、变量定义    47
三、模型构建    49
第三节  实证结果与分析    50
一、描述性统计分析    50
二、政治关联与民营企业环保投资    51
三、政治关联与民营企业获取政府环保补助    56
四、政治关联、政府环保补助与民营企业环保投资    59
五、稳健性检验    61
第四节  本章小结    62
第四章  政治关联、环境规制与民营企业环保投资    64
第一节  理论分析与研究假设    64
一、环境规制对民营企业环保投资的直接影响    64
二、特定环境规制条件下政治关联对民营企业环保投资的影响    65
三、环境规制对政治关联与民营企业环保投资关系的调节效应    67
第二节  地区环境规制强度的测算    68
一、单一指标衡量的地区环境规制强度    68
二、替代指标衡量的地区环境规制强度    69
三、复合指标衡量的地区环境规制强度    71
第三节  实证研究设计与结果分析    72
一、模型设定    72
二、环境规制与民营企业环保投资    73
三、特定环境规制条件下的政治关联与民营企业环保投资    74
四、环境规制对政治关联与民营企业环保投资关系的调节效应    77
五、稳健性检验    80
第四节  本章小结    81
第五章  政治关联、地区经济发展与民营企业环保投资    83
第一节  理论分析与研究假设    83
一、地区经济发展与民营企业环保投资    83
二、差异化区域经济条件对政治关联与民营企业环保投资关系的影响    84
第二节  研究设计    85
一、样本选择    85
二、模型设定和变量说明    85
第三节  实证结果与分析    87
一、地区经济发展对民营企业总体政治关联与环保投资关系的影响    87
二、地区经济发展对民营企业中央政治关联与环保投资关系的影响    88
三、地区经济发展对民营企业地方政治关联与环保投资关系的影响    88
四、稳健性检验    89
第四节  本章小结    91
第六章  研究总结与政策建议    92
第一节  研究总结    92
一、研究结论    92
二、研究创新    93
三、研究局限与进一步研究方向    94
第二节  政策建议    95
一、政府层面    95
二、企业层面    97
参考文献    100
附录A  第三章实证分析稳健性检验结果    110
附录B  第四章实证分析稳健性检验结果    112
一、按第一种方式的稳健性检验结果    112
二、按第二种方式的稳健性检验结果    115